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For these reasons I would argue that the physical impact of the clash between intention and realization in mediated presence is not as profound as when this clash takes place in natural presence. People operate the technologies, learn quickly how to do this when the feedback is as expected, and find ways to integrate the technologies into their daily lives. The fact that a certain impact does not occur is another reason, I presume, that people easily accept information and communication technologies. The 'ethical' confrontation of the effect of mediated presence is hardly rooted in physical experience. Such ethical confrontations are based on physical feelings of happiness and sadness, pleasure and pain, compassion or neglect, as is argued by Antonio Damasio, and which I will discuss later in this section (Damasio 2004). When human rights are violated in natural presence in such a way that physical effects are clear, as is the case with malnutrition and (fear of) violence and torture, for example, the awareness that something that is wrong is taking place is undeniable for all the actors involved, including the people who witness it. When actions with such possible effect are not physically sensed, it is much harder to incorporate them into the awareness of the situation that an actor finds himself in, and upon which he or she bases his or her actions. While more and more networks are being developed that are increasingly vital for people's survival, so violations become more and more likely to happen, people do not seem to worry about this. I would argue that this is also partly caused by a lack of physical clashes between intention and realization when presence is mediated.